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ABSTRACT 
Pressure groups are increasingly becoming more active in challenging business. This 
paper looks at these challenges in terms of the business and society relationship and 
focuses on the use of consumer boycotts by pressure groups. Case examples are 
included. Conclusions are drawn on how pressure group use of the consumer boycott 
may be understood. Most notably, that it represents an attempt at the social control of 
business. These observations have a wider application to the many other forms of 
lobbying of business by pressure groups. The term social responsibility in business is 
shown to be potentially misleading, unless it is used to refer to corporate doctrines on 
social responsibility or the outcome of a conflict between (and accommodation of) 
corporate interests and other interests in society, including those represented by pressure 
groups. 
2 
Lobbying the CorDoration 
Pollution, nuclear disarmament, apartheid in South Africa and many other issues, 
are of concern to a lot of people. Quite rightly, they are interested in and worried about 
some of the major problems facing society. These people are - in a sense - represented 
by pressure groups. In the course of their efforts to tackle such issues, these pressure 
groups are likely to challenge business. This paper considers these challenges and how 
they may be understood, within the context of the business and society relationship. 
There have been many instances of pressure group challenges of business in 
recent years and their incidence is increasing. Case studies are given later in this paper 
but other instances are worth mentioning. Anti-Apartheid and associated pressure 
groups, for example, have been prominent in campaigning against firms having links 
with South Africa since the Sharpeville shootings in 1960. Companies such as RTZ and 
Shell have become accustomed to their Annual General Meetings being disrupted by 
anti-apartheid protesters. But the main thrust of the pressure group activity is the 
international consumer boycott campaign. This has involved many UK companies in 
critical and damaging publicity, with quite severe consequences for some (1). 
Long before the Chernobyl disaster, pressure groups were campaigning against 
nuclear power. Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have been particularly active. The 
latter group, dissatisfied with efforts to influence government, chose to tackle the 
industry directly. It was Greenpeace who, while attempting to ‘cap’ a pipe discharging 
radioactive material from Sellafield (Windscale) into the sea, came across an extremely 
high level of discharge. This was well in excess of the level permitted by the government 
and which Greenpeace were (illegally) trying to prevent. The government investigation 
of this accident blamed the Sellafield management and made twenty-three 
recommendations for improvements. The outcome, in addition to the mobilisation of 
public opinion, was promises by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., to reorganise its 
management, discipline some employees, spend an extra f 12 million to improve safety, 
and accelerate plans to reduce radioactive discharges into the sea. Greenpeace observed 
that this accident may not have been the first and still sought an end to all radioactive 
discharges (2). Pressure group actions alone rarely achieve the aims of the group. 
However, Greenpeace has played a major role in creating the current public antipathy 
towards nuclear power. The industry, belatedly and clumsily, is at last responding to 
public concern over the issue. Greenpeace have also tackled other firms - again using 
‘direct action’ - over environmental issues such as the dumping of hazardous chemicals 
at sea and whaling. 
Another issue which greatly concerns many people is animal welfare. This has 
had an impact on many firms, from those marketing cosmetics and toiletries tested on 
animals to laboratories involved in vivisection. More recently, concern for animal 
welfare has, for a minority at least, changed to a concern for animal rights. Groups 
such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) are involved in around 2000 actions a year, 
from various actions involving stores such as Boots and against butchers, to bomb attacks 
on vivisectionists. They are said to be causing damage estimated at six million pounds a 
year. In November 1984, Mars chocolate bars were found containing notes warning 
against eating “cruelty-based products;” though the bars did not prove to be poisoned, as 
at first feared. This direct action by the ALF, because of Mars’ funding of dental 
research using monkeys, cost the company f3 million (3). 
These are just a few examples of the increasing lobbying of business by pressure 
groups in Britain. Their efforts reflect concern about issues of social responsibility in 
business: apartheid and company involvement in South Africa, environmental issues, 
animal issues, and so on. They may be interpreted as being protests at a perceived lack 
of social responsibility on the part of the firm. 
This view of pressure groups and their actions involving business depends greatly 
on one’s beliefs and interests, but also how one defines, and the limits to, social 
responsibility in business. Hence such an interpretation is considered here by, first of 
all, looking at the meaning of social responsibility in business. This is not as 
straightforward as it might appear. Indeed, there are many similarities to the confusion 
experienced by Alice in Alice in Wonderland, to whom Humpty Dumpty said: “When 1 
use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.” 
What is Social Resnonsibilitv in Business? 
Most managers, and many other people, have an idea about what the term social 
responsibility in business means. After all, there has been a considerable amount written 
on the subject (4). Hay, Gray and Gates, for example, write: “a modern view of social 
responsibility . . . would encompass not only a deep commitment to social problems, but 
also an understanding of the firm’s responsibility to its contributors and, most 
importantly, a realistic comprehension of the need for profit as an essential prerequisite /’ 
a._. _, .- 
for operating at higher levels of social responsibility” (5). While two leading members of 
the American clergy have commented that “corporate decision-makers should begin to 
consider the social implications of their decisions as carefully and with as much weight 
as they do the economic . . . life and death are more important than profit and loss” (6). 
And Philip Sadler, from Ashridge in England, has said, “society has the right to require 
industry (which is part of itself) to pursue social objectives” (7). 
Much of what has been written about social responsibility in business is in this 
sort of vein. As an admonition to management, it’s well-meaning but often excessively 
value-laden. Heilbroner has observed that this is an area in which “syrup flows freely” 
(8). This syrupy quality isn’t the only problem, these statements give very little 
guidance on what managers should actually &. 
Reasonable definitions of social responsibility in business can be found. Farmer 
and Hogue suggest corporate social responsibility involves “actions that, when judged by 
society in the future, are seen to have been of maximum help in providing necessary 
amounts of desired goods and services at minimum financial and social costs, distributed 
as equitably as possible” (9). However, they give no indication as to where managers 
may find a suitable crystal ball. A more useful approach is to define social 
responsibility in relation to the firm’s stakeholders. So Jones suggests it involves “the 
notion that corporations have an obligation to constituent groups in society other than 
stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract” (10). Similarly, 
Powers and Vogel write: “In its more sophisticated forms, corporate responsibility has 
come to mean that the interests of the several corporate constituencies are no longer seen 
as constraints on corporate activity which must be managed; instead these constituencies 
are seen as stakeholders, groups which have legitimate interests, and at least some of 
whose claims should be met and reconciled in the management process” (11). Both 
sources, however, acknowledge the problems in understanding corporate social 
responsibility. 
The position of this author is that if one accepts that firms have a social role 
then clearly they have social responsibilities. Yet this does leave four fairly major 
questions: How may these responsibilities be defined or identified? How does 
management determine their relative priority? How far does corporate social 
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responsibility extend? (That is to say, over what issues and to what extent?) How do 
managers actually act in practice? 
So, for all these reasons, it is sensible to exercise considerable caution when 
people start talking about social responsibility in business. The term doesn’t actually 
mean anything. Within the literature, there is a great variety of definitions to be found. 
Substantial differences are elicited if managers are asked to give their definitions or if 
one examines corporate statements on responsibilities. A term so debased has no 
meaning. All firm’s say, or would say if asked, that they are socially responsible. It’s 
difficult to see how one can disbelieve them. Not surprisingly therefore, David 
Clutterbuck has advocated total corporate social responsibility: 
“The chief executive who assumes that his company is a good corporate citizen 
because it has well-meant policies towards some social issues is making the 
mistake of assuming that social responsibility is something to add on to a 
company’s activities - an external veneer aimed at keeping the outside world 
happy. The moment social responsibility becomes part of the company’s public 
relations activities, it is a dead duck. Not only will outsiders frequently see 
through the sham, but people inside the company will soon get the idea that 
social responsibility does not really matter, that it is only for show, and that they 
are at liberty to slide around social responsibility issues if it becomes convenient” 
(12). 
For the current author, the term social responsibility in business is best used to 
refer to managements’ attempts at self-regulation of their activities; to corporate 
doctrines on good practice. There is a more useful way of looking at the relationship 
between business and society and the role of pressure group activity within that. 
Corporate Power in the Business and Society Relationship 
One person’s view of business social responsibilities not as yet considered is 
Milton Friedman’s; a view often espoused - though probably less often practiced - by 
managers. He has said “there is one and only one social responsibility of business - to 
use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it 
stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition, without deception or fraud” (13). 
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He, along with Hayek, Theodore Levitt, and others, argues the social 
responsibility of business is to make a profit. This isn’t the sort of ‘wishy-washy’ 
position earlier found and it actually gives guidance to managers. Often, however, it is 
summarily dismissed without any thought given as to why Friedman and others should 
advance it. This author doesn’t subscribe to Friedman’s position - principally because of 
the inaccuracies of and disagreement with, his model of capitalism. However, his 
arguments against social responsibility beyond profit maximisation are worth noting. Six 







Spending someone else’s money. The costs of social actions are involuntarily 
borne by shareholders, customers or others. 
Competing claims - the role of profit. Other claims involve the deliberate 
sacrifice of profits or at least muddy decision-making. 
Competitive disadvantage. Social actions have a price. 
Competence. How are firms to know what their social responsibilities are? Do 
firms have the skills to deal with social issues? 
Fairness - domination by business. Do we want corporations playing God? 
Legitimacy - the role of government. Social actions are the legitimate concern of 
government not business. 
The last two arguments are particularly interesting in that they point to an 
alternative perspective on the business and society relationship. Friedman asks: “Is it 
tolerable that these public functions of taxation, expenditure, and control be exercised 
by the people who happen at the moment to be in charge of particular enterprises, 
chosen for those posts by strictly private groups ?” (14). This highlights the problem of 
the social control of business. Unlike Friedman, this author believes business has social 
responsibilities beyond profit maximisation. Indeed, business has responsibilities thrust 
upon it which it can today no longer avoid. To ensure that business deals with these 
responsibilities and in a way that society would approve, there must be social control of 
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business. A focus on the social control of business is a far more useful way of looking 
at the business and society relationship (15). 
So, not only is the social responsibilities approach to examining the business and 
society relationship weak - and best seen as providing a doctrine for management in the 
absence of any other basis for action - but it also diverts attention from the real issue, 
that of corporate power and the control of it. With meaning for the term social 
responsibility in business proving elusive, it is preferable to examine pressure group 
actions, including consumer boycotts, from the perspective of the business and society 
relationship and in terms of a focus on the core issue, the social control of business. 
Social Control of Business 
Studies of power, while acknowledging the complexities of the concept, generally 
identify three types: force, inducement and manipulation. Bertrand Russell, who defines 
power as “the production of intended effects” (16), neatly illustrates this: 
“The most important organisations are approximately distinguishable by the kind 
of power that they exert. The army and the police exercise coercive power over 
the body; economic organisations, in the main, use rewards and punishments as 
incentives and deterrents; schools, churches and political parties aim at 
influencing opinion. But these distinctions are not very clear-cut, since every 
organisation uses other forms of power in addition to the one which is most 
characteristic” (17). 
Similarly, Galbraith identified condign, compensatory and conditioned power, in 
looking at the types of power business exercises (18). However, one can, conversely, 
look at the types of power society exercises over business. This gives rise to a simple 
model of the social control of business, shown in Figure 1. The weaknesses of each 
form of control are also given. 
So, legislation over business is society exerting power by force. Business has to 
act within the law or face sanctions. The market as a mechanism for the social control 
of business is society exerting power by inducement. Simply stated, it is a method by 
which society rewards corporate social responsibility with profits and irresponsibility 




FORM OF CONTROL TYPE OF POWER WEAKNESSES 
1. Legislation Coercive Over loaded 
(government Force Limited effectiveness 
intervention) Condign Threat to market system 











F igure 1. Social Control of Business - A Simple Mode l 
the exercise of purchase votes, as G ist puts it: 
“A fundamental  tenet of our economic system is that scarce economic resources 
are ultimately allocated by the preference patterns of final consumers; that is, we 
as consumers vote, as it were, for particular types of institutions and  for 
particular types of products and  services. W e  vote by purchasing things we wish 
to encourage in institutions we wish to encourage. W e  vote by not buying things 
we wish to discourage” (19). 
The  market does provide a  big incentive for business to do  as people (customers) 
want. So, in response to critics of business practices W e idenbaum writes: 
“The  fiction that business does not care about people because profit comes first 
should be  exposed for the errant nonsense that it is. Business has all the 
incentives to take actions that result in improving human welfare. The  reasons 
for doing so arise, of course, not out of benevolence but out of hard-nosed, 
practical and  effective economic incentives. More purchases by willing 
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customers do tend to generate more profits and greater accumulation of capital” 
(20). 
The third form of control, moral obligation, is where the social control of 
business is achieved by virtue of society exerting power through conditioning, resulting 
in self-regulation. As Berle writes, “corporate managements . . . are constrained to work 
within a frame of surrounding conceptions which in time impose themselves” (21). 
There will inevitably be cultural precedents to business action. In the UK, the 
Confederation of British Industry has commented, in recognition of this: “While the law 
establishes the minimum standard of conduct with which a company must comply if it is 
to be allowed to exist and trade, a company, like a natural person, must be recognised as 
having functions, duties and moral obligations that go beyond the pursuit of profit and 
the specific requirements of legislation” (22). So, under the third form of control, 
managers are guided by social norms. Self-regulation also involves, as Berle conveys 
above, the unconscious guidance of what society expects. Put crudely, managers, like all 
members of society, are conditioned in such a way that constrains their behaviour, 
according to the social conditioning limitations on all human choice behaviour. 
The model of the social control of business is useful in that it not only 
distinguishes between &l the different ways in which society controls business, but also 
suggests how control may be increased (23). If one recognises that business and society 
can have different interests, how can it be ensured that society’s interests are 
paramount? Legislation seems overloaded and, because of the difficulties in defining 
social responsibilities, limited in effectiveness. It is also, as a market intervention, 
considered a threat to the market system, as Weidenbaum and many others argue (24). 
Market forces are generally considered insufficient because they emphasise efficiency 
(and a freedom of sorts) above other criteria such as equity or altruism and don’t take 
externalities - especially social costs - into account. Finally, moral obligation, firms’ 
deliberate attempts at self-regulation according to a doctrine of social responsibility but 
also manager beliefs about what is ‘right’ arising from socialisation, is considered unfair 
and elitist and, partly for that reason, inadequate. The considerable weaknesses of the 
first and third forms of control suggest greater use might be made of market forces, the 
second form. It would, after all, be in keeping with the current politico-economic 
climate. 
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This is where consumer boycotts, of all the various forms of pressure group 
action, fit in most aptly. Markets operate through and are legitimised by consumer 
sovereignty. Why shouldn’t that power - the authority of consumers in the marketplace 
- be harnessed in the social control of business on social responsibility issues? And, of 
course, it has. The first black American presidential candidate, Jesse Jackson, has used 
boycotts in his campaigning for civil rights. He has commented: 
“We have the power, nonviolently, just be controlling our appetites, to determine 
the direction of the American economy. If black people in thirty cities said 
simultaneously “General Motors, you will not sell cars in the black community 
unless you guarantee us a franchise here next year and help us finance it,” GM 
would have no choice but to comply” (25). 
There are many other illustrations of this (26). 
Consumer boycotts involve not buying from a firm in protest at a perceived lack 
of social responsibility. This is illustrated in the two cases which follow. They are then 
examined to see whether consumer boycotts may be understood as a form of social 
control of business. Both cases are presented in summary form, but may be found in 
more detail elsewhere (27). 
MAN-VW. Tarmac and the Campaian for Nuclear Disarmament 
The boycotts in Britain of Tarmac and MAN-VW over their links with cruise 
missiles were organised by what at the time was probably the largest and most influential 
promotional pressure group in Britain. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) 
comprised around 1,500 local groups and 400,000 people. Moreover, a majority of the 
population supported their opposition to cruise. Yet the boycotts were clearly 
unsuccessful. 
The 1979 decision by NATO’s European members to site cruise missiles in 
Europe, provided a focal point for the peace movement and CND achieved a forty-fold 
increase in size. At its previous peak in popularity CND had been divided on the use 
of direct action, this time its leadership was prepared to tolerate different forms of 
protest. CND endorsed non-violent direct action (NVDA) and set-up working groups to 
devise suitable campaigns. The more extreme forms of direct action, such as the peace 
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camps, received most publicity, but CND did, in May 1983, announce their intention to 
boycott MAN-VW, Tarmac, and the National Savings Bank (NSB), and this received 
extensive coverage. Even at this stage however, CND had its doubts about the 
suitability of these targets. Yet although the NSB action was never initiated, the other 
two boycotts went ahead. 
Tarmac was the main contractor for an El 1 million contract to provide cruise 
missile storage facilities at Greenham Common airbase. A peace camp protestor had 
approached the Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) local authorities about Tarmac, and Southwark 
Council had already responded to her boycott request prior to CND’s announcement. 
CND were simply picking up this campaign. Tarmac’s response to CND’s announcement 
reiterated its position as expressed when Southwark had reported that it would no longer 
be using the company. This emphasised that many firms were involved, sought to direct 
attention towards government, and hinted at unemployment or legal threats. NFZ 
authorities felt they couldn’t publicly support the campaign because of the likelihood of 
legal action, but some surreptitiously boycotted Tarmac, not including the firm - one of 
the largest contractors in the country - on their tender lists. 
As the campaign did not materialise as CND had threatened, Tarmac maintained 
a low profile; but it would have used legal action otherwise. It is possible that customer 
resistance to Tarmac remains over their involvement with cruise, as revealed in the 
firm’s decision in August 1985 to close their Peterborough office, but the boycott 
seemed to fade away. This probably has as much to do with the NFZ authorities’ other 
problems and higher priorities as with CND’s failure to actively promote the boycott. 
Though it is worth noting that in October 1986, the Environment Secretary, Nicholas 
Ridley, announced legislation to stop councils imposing political conditions on their 
contracts. He specifically referred to discrimination against construction companies 
involved in nuclear missile sites (28). This suggests the boycott had some impact, even 
if it did not significantly affect the commissioning of the cruise missile base. 
CND put far greater effort into the MAN-VW boycott, though it did not have its 
unqualified support. The launch of the campaign was a series of blunders. CND’s 
announcement of its intention to boycott MAN was made without having had any 
contact with the firm. The announcement suggested MAN were involved in supplying 
the cruise missile launchers, whereas MAN (in Germany) were supplying 400 allegedly 
standard military tractor units. This confusion was repeated when the boycott was 
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subsequently launched and after the company had been in contact with CND to clari.fy 
the point. Moreover, the vehicles were to be delivered by air not road, and would 
therefore not be as visible as expected. Finally, when seeking a meeting with the 
company, the letter from CND Chairwoman Joan Ruddock was sent too late and to the 
wrong person. Yet this latter blunder was unimportant anyway as the group’s demands 
of MAN could not have possibly been realised, at least through MAN-VW (UK), an 
independent concessioniare. The boycott did not get off to a good start! 
MAN-VW were initially quite concerned by the campaign, particularly with the 
threat of demonstrations outside their VW car showrooms. When it seemed likely to go 
ahead they urged their dealers to be careful not to provoke further publicity. Yet the 
launch, which CND said involved 10 truck centres, proved to be a “damp squib” in the 
firm’s eyes. Although there was further picketing, this boycott also faded away. The 
impact of the boycott was negligible. Its failure is attributed, by the firm, to the 
tenuousness of its link with cruise and the recognition of this by CND supporters. The 
firm’s response was to be as open as possible, emphasising the tenuousness of the link, 
with legal action, although possible, as definitely a last resort. CND was found to be 
poorly organised but it had essentially got it wrong. As one MAN-VW manager 
explained: “It doesn’t matter how effective a publicity or PR machine is, if it’s 
spreading things that are basically not valid, it won’t get any further.” 
Douwe Egberts and AnPola Coffee 
The Angola Committee were far better organised and more committed to their 
boycott of Douwe Egberts than CND were on the Tarmac and MAN boycotts. Their 
demand was also realistic. They wanted the firm to stop processing coffee from Angola, 
then (1972) seeking independence from Portugal. 
Before launching its action, the pressure group contacted the company to arrange 
a meeting. The company agreed to this but did not feel it could give in to the pressure 
group. This was despite the scale of the action planned, public concern about Angola, 
and Albert Heijn, the second largest coffee roaster (to Douwe Egberts) and the largest 
Dutch supermarket chain, having agreed not to process Angola coffee. Two more 
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supermarket chains followed suit before the campaign was launched amid much 
publicity. 
Consumer support for the pressure group was clearly demonstrated in feedback 
from the sales force and in a market research study. Picketing of shops and 
supermarkets ensured that consumers were likely to express this support in purchase. 
But pressure on the firm also came from other directions. Some of the media SUppOTted 
the Angola Committee, a quasi-government body provided it with funds and the Dutch 
Labour Party registered its support. Meanwhile, Douwe Egberts’ employees had been 
under pressure, from picketing by the Committee, but also criticism from friends and 
family; the union found it could no longer support the management and threatened 
action. Under all this pressure, Douwe Egberts finally capitulated and agreed not to 
process any more Angola coffee because “consumers have objections.” 
The company received some criticism for deciding to capitulate, but sales in the 
long-run did not suffer because of this. The management wished they’d followed Albert 
Heijn’s example. The pressure group’s success prompted a similar, also successful, action 
against Gulf Oil. 
Conclusions 
The events described in the two cases are fairly typical of the sort of pressure 
group inspired consumer boycott that firms are ever more likely to face. The contrast 
between the unsuccessful and the successful boycotts, highlights many of the factors in 
pressure group success with this tactic which can be briefly commented on here. First 
and foremost, however, there is the requirement to examine these boycotts in terms of 
the business and society relationship. More specifically, can they be understood as 
attempts at the social control of business? 
In both cases, the pressure groups concerned - CND and the Angola Committee - 
were seeking to exert some control over business. CND were saying to Tarmac that their 
involvement in the building of cruise missile silos was not in society’s interests. Tarmac 
were not particularly vulnerable to action by consumers, but a number of local 
authorities chose to respond by considering whether they wanted to give business to the 
firm. It seems likely that Tarmac did suffer as a consequence, though the extent of this 
would be difficult to quantify even for those in a position to do so within Tarmac. 
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However, if CND’s objective - assuming there was one - was to stop Tarmac building 
the silos, then they were unsuccessful. Their success seems limited to tarnishing 
Tarmac’s image with some of its customers (and others), to probably denying them 
contracts with some of the 147 NFZ local authorities, and to generating publicity. The 
action illustrated the recognition by CND that a pressure group needn’t restrict its 
activities to the government. As an activist commented at the time in Peace News: “it 
may well be easier to influence a firm than the government. And if we break one link 
in the chain, the whole will be weaker.” 
In targetting MAN-VW, CND was at least tackling a firm potentially more 
vulnerable to consumer action. MAN and VW in Germany had only the slightest of 
relationships (joint manufacture of a light commercial vehicle), but the concessionaires 
for MAN in the UK (VAG, a Lonrho subsidiary) handled both MAN and VW 
vehicles. However, largely because of the tenousness of the link between MAN- 
VW (UK) and MAN (Germany,), little support could be found for the action against 
MAN in the UK, let alone VW. (Local authorities were not major purchasers of 
MAN vehicles.) If VW had been a major supplier of vehicles for cruise missile 
convoys, then, particularly given the ‘liberal’ profile of VW’s customers, the outcome of 
the boycott may have been very different. As it was, the boycott proved to be a minor 
irritation to a firm which, although part of a parent company with a less than 
unblemished record, seems sensitive to social issues. 
With both Tarmac and MAN-VW, CND were attempting to exert some control 
over business. For the most part, and especially in the case of MAN-VW, their efforts 
were unsuccessful because they were unable to command wider support. In contrast, the 
Angola Committe achieved widespread support. Consumers could readily associate 
Douwe Egberts with the oppression in Angola - a matter of great public debate - and 
they were presented with a relatively straightforward means by which they could register 
their concern. Pressure also came from other quarters: employees, the union, the media, 
and politicians. The outcome was that the firm was brought under the control of 
society, principally through the use of market forces. As the Douwe Egberts sales 
director commented in response to difficulties reported by the firm’s sales force: 
“We told them that the company could not take a political position. On the other 
hand, they know that they should follow the customer - the customer is always 
right. This was Ok as long as the customer was only interested in the taste of 
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coffee. Now, for the first time, the customer expressed an opinion about 
something very different.” 
In other words, consumer sovereignty need not be restricted to the product itself. 
The consumer may vote in the marketplace against a firm for any activity it is involved 
in, in any sphere of its operations, which the consumer is aware of and concerned about. 
Most recently, of course, with consumers having chosen to vote against Barclays Bank, 
prompted by anti-apartheid pressure groups, Barclays has been forced to withdraw from 
South Africa (29). Again, other pressures played a part, but it was principally the social 
control of business through market forces which brought about this quite considerable 
success for anti-apartheid groups. 
So in sum, the cases illustrate pressure group use of the consumer boycott in 
efforts to achieve control over business on social issues. In the Douwe Egberts and 
Angola Coffee case (and with Barclays and South Africa) this became social control of 
business, as the group succeeded in attracting wider support for its campaign. As these 
and many other cases show, pressure group success with the consumer boycott is 
dependent on public response to the action. However, it is not sufficient for a pressure 
group to be active on an issue of great concern to the public at large. As the CND case 
illustrates, the choice of target - specificaliy, the appropriateness of the firm and the 
product to be boycotted - is also important. So too, is the organisation and strategy of 
the pressure group (30). 
The consumer boycott is not the only tactic used by pressure groups against 
firms. There are many others. However, they are also efforts to seek control over 
business on social issues. The aim is corporate social responsibility as these groups 
define it. If they succeed through the support of society at large, then the outcome is 
corporate social responsibility as society would define it. Perhaps the term social 
responsibility in business cannot be defined in the abstract, but only in the concrete 
reality of conflict resolution. Hence, social responsibility in business can refer to 
corporate doctrines on good practice, but also be seen as the end-result of an 
accommodation of different interests within society over a social issue. 
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